Serving Danish Foreign Policy: Professor Hojer’s 1735 De eo quod iure belli licet in minores by Mads Langballe Jensen
1
Serving Danish Foreign Policy: Professor Hojer’s 1735 De eo quod iure belli licet in minores
Mads Langballe Jensen, Royal Holloway, University of London
This is an uncorrected, pre-proof version. Please do not cite.
Forthcoming in Simone Zurbuchen (ed.), in The Law of Nations and Natural Law, 1625-1850, Brill, 
Leiden. 
1. Introduction
Andreas Hojer (1690–1739) is arguably one of the most fascinating but understudied figures in the 
early enlightenment in Denmark. Hailing from Schleswig-Holstein, Hojer studied in Halle under 
Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), where he became fascinated with the new teachings on natural 
law and the law of nations. His first published works were an academic exercise on 
(non-)prohibition of incestuous marriage by divine law, the De nuptiis propinquorum iure divino 
non prohibitis diagramma, and a short history of Denmark.1 Both works led him into polemics and 
rivalry with Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754), who is now widely considered the (only) major figure of
the early Danish enlightenment. Having successfully weathered a storm over his work on marriage, 
Hojer was employed in a string of positions, including royal historiographer and Justitsråd, before 
being appointed the first ex officio professor of the law of nature and nations at Copenhagen 
University in 1734.2 
No substantive account of his natural law theorizing and its political and intellectual 
1 Andreas Hojer, Kurtzgefasste Dännemärckische Geschichte vom Anfang dieses mächtigen Reichs bis 
zum Ausgang des XVII. Seculi (Flensburg: Bosseck, 1719); Andreas Hojer, De nuptiis propinquorum iure divino non 
prohibitis (n.p.: n.n., 1718).
2 Troels G. Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker (København: Arne Frost-Hansens Forlag, 
1961), 134. For the university statutes, see William Norvin, Københavns Universitet i Reformationens og Orthodoxiens 
Tidsalder, vol. 2 (København: Gyldendal, 1940), 114.
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significance has thus far been attempted. An informative and detailed biography of Hojer was 
published in 1961, and Hojer is mentioned in the standard histories of jurisprudence in Denmark.3 
But in neither case is there any detailed discussion of his teachings on natural law.4 This is perhaps 
because the sources are rather disappointing. According to a lecture catalogue, Hojer lectured 
publicly on ‘the law of nature as well as the precepts of moral philosophy’ in 1736–40.5 But 
seemingly no notes from Hojer's lectures on natural law survive. Instead, the most important 
sources for Hojer’s teaching on natural law are his programme or manual for Danish students of law
from 1736, the Idea iurisconsulti danici (with a Danish translation the following year), and his 
inaugural dissertation at the occasion of his appointment to the professorship of natural law, De eo 
quod iure belli licet in minores, published the year before.6 Of these two, the latter provides the 
most substantial view of his mature thoughts on the law of nations and natural law. To this might be
added his early Diagramma, which was, however, published eighteen years before he started 
lecturing.
This chapter offers a characterization of Hojer’s theory of natural law and the law of nations 
3 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker; Ditlev Tamm, Juraen på Københavns Universitet 1479-
2005 (København: Københavns Universitet, 2005), 66, 70ff, 92ff. 
4 There is, however, a brief but indicative discussion of Hojer’s natural law theory in Knud Haakonssen, 
‘Holberg’s Law of Nature and Nations,’ in Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754): Learning and Literature in the Nordic 
Enlightenment, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 59–
79.
5 ‘Jus Naturæ nec non Moralis Philosophiæ Præcepta’, Lectiones publicae Professorum in Universitate Hauniensi (Hafniae: Ex 
Typographeo Regiae Majest. & Universit., n.d.). See also Holger Rørdam, ed., Historiske Samlinger og Studier 
vedrørende danske Forhold og Studier især i det 17. Aarhundrede (Kjøbenhavn: Gad, 1891-1902), IV: 146.
6 Andreas Hojer, Dissertatio iuris publici universalis de eo quod iure belli licet in minores, Vom Recht 
des Krieges gegen die Minderjährige (Hafniae: Typis Reg. Majest. & Universit. Typogr. Joh. G. Höpffneri, 1735); 
Andreas Hojer, Ideae Icti Danici partem 1. disputatione anniversaria expositam publico eruditorum examini subiciit 
Andreas Hoier (Hafniae: Typis Reg. Majest. & Universit. Typogr. Joh. G. Höpffneri, 1736); Andreas Hojer, 
Forestilling paa en Dansk Jurist, den 1. Part (Kjøbenhavn: Kongl. Majests. priviligerede Bogtrykkerie, 1737).
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on the basis of his inaugural dissertation De eo quod iure belli licet in minores and its intellectual 
and political significance in early-eighteenth-century Denmark-Norway. The following section 
briefly outlines the intellectual context of natural law theorizing in Copenhagen around 1700. The 
chapter then proceeds to outline the political context of the conflict with the dukes of Holstein-
Gottorp over the dominion of Schleswig, followed by a discussion of the polemics on this question 
during the Great Northern War. This provides the background for a detailed analysis of Hojer’s 
inaugural dissertation, on the basis of which the chapter offers a concluding interpretation of 
Hojer’s natural law profile and its significance.
2. Natural law in Copenhagen in the early eighteenth century
Although Hojer was the first to hold a professorship in Copenhagen in the law of nature and 
nations, he was not the first to work on the discipline or teach it. The subject had been taught there 
since the 1690s, by the Kiel-educated Henrik Weghorst (1653–1722) and by Christian Reitzer 
(1665–1736), who had conducted much of his studies under Christian Thomasius in Halle before 
being appointed professor of law at Copenhagen University. Each published several shorter works 
on natural law.7 In addition, in 1716 Ludvig Holberg had published the first compendium on natural
law in the Danish language, drawing on Hugo Grotius, Christian Thomasius and especially Samuel 
Pufendorf.8 Finally, the likewise Halle-educated Christoph Heinrich Amthor (1678–1721), 
professor of natural law, public law and politics at Kiel University, had published works in favour 
of the Danish monarch Frederick IV during the Great Northern War. For this service he was 
7 For a discussion of the natural law profiles of these first teachers of the subject in Copenhagen, see 
Mads Langballe Jensen, ‘Contests about Natural Law in Early Enlightenment Copenhagen,’ History of European Ideas 
42, no. 8 (16 November 2016): 1027–41, doi:10.1080/01916599.2016.1182045.
8 On Holberg’s natural law theory, including its different uses, see Knud Haakonssen and Sebastian 
Olden-Jørgensen, eds., Ludvig Holberg (1684-1754): Learning and Literature in the Nordic Enlightenment (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2017); Jørgen Sejersted and Eiliv Vinje, eds., Ludvig Holbergs naturret (Oslo: Gyldendal 
Akademisk, 2012).
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awarded positions as Justitsråd and royal historiographer. Although he published little on natural 
law in Copenhagen, where he died in 1721, he published several polemical works on the conflict 
with Holstein-Gottorp during the war, and his lectures on ethics, natural law and decorum were 
published posthumously in 1738.9
In the years before receiving the professorship in natural law, Andreas Hojer had in more 
than one way taken up the mantle from Amthor. Apart from continuing Amthor’s work on the 
history and life of Frederick IV, he had also defended Danish interests to the south. When 
Denmark-Norway came into conflict with the free imperial city of Hamburg, as a consequence of 
the latter setting up a new exchange bank and refusing to accept Danish currency on equal rates, 
Hojer advised the Danish government on the best measures to take in accordance with the law of 
nations, and also published anonymous polemical works on the conflict intended to sway public 
opinion towards Denmark-Norway.10 It is thus not surprising that when, in a letter of May 1735, 
Hojer mentioned a desire to choose a topic for his inaugural dissertation that would please the king, 
Danish political interests to the south were predominant. The first potential topic concerned what 
was allowed in war against minors, the second that Denmark had never been a feudal vassal of the 
German Empire, the third concerned the Emperor's rights to mint coins (against Moser), the fourth 
9 Christoph Heinrich Amthor, Philosophia moralis seu doctrina de justo, honesto et decoro. Hierbey ist 
statt einer Vorrede vorangesetzet Authoris unvorgreiffliche Gedancken von der beqvemsten Methode, deren sich ein 
academischer Lehrer bedienen kan (Hafniae, Lipsiae: Joh. Nicol. Lossius, 1738). For Amthor's biography, see Heiner 
F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn, eds., Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (London: Continuum, 
2010), 17f.; Carl Frederik Bricka, ed., Dansk biografisk Lexikon tillige omfattende Norge for Tidsrummet 1537-1814 
(Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1887), 1: 197f., available online at http://runeberg.org/dbl/. For 
Amthor’s work on decorum, see Kasper Risbjerg Eskildsen, ‘Print, Fashion, and the Making of the Enlightenment 
Philosopher,’ in Northern Antiquities and National Identities. Perceptions of Denmark and the North in the Eighteenth 
Century, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Henrik Horstbøl (København: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 
2008), 126–44.
10 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 103f.
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the Emperor's rights over the river Elbe, which had been bestowed on Hamburg, and the final one 
concerned the east Frisians' status by public law. Of these, Hojer eventually chose the first.11
To understand why Hojer chose that particular topic, we need to look into the larger 
intellectual and political context. All of Hojer's suggested topics concerned Denmark-Norway's 
political interests to the south, and his final choice of subject tapped directly into the political-legal 
debates of the Great Northern War.
3. Denmark-Norway in the Great Northern War
In the Great Northern War of 1700–1721, Denmark-Norway was allied with Saxony-Poland and 
Russia against Sweden. To the south of Denmark was the ducal house of Schleswig-Holstein-
Gottorp. The Gottorp family was a cadet branch of the Oldenburg family in Denmark, which had 
been vassals of the Danish crown until the mid-seventeenth century, when Sweden had forced the 
Danish king to accept the sovereignty of Gottorp.12 For most of the war, the ruler of Gottorp was the
underage duke Charles Frederick (1700–1739), and although Gottorp had adopted a position of 
neutrality it did not escape being drawn into the war. At the outset of the war, Frederick IV of 
Denmark-Norway invaded and occupied the ducal lands in Schleswig-Holstein.13 Initially, 
Frederick IV was forced to withdraw and sign the Peace of Travendal in 1700, promising not to 
11 Andreas Hojer, ‘[Letter to an unnamed “Monseigneur”]’, 28 May 1735, Royal Library, Copenhagen: 
MS Kall 383, 4to. The letter, as well as (very briefly) the inaugural dissertation, is summarised in Jørgensen, Andreas 
Hojer, jurist og historiker, 246–48.
12 For a brief overview of Danish-Gottorp-Swedish relations in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century, see Otto Brandt, Caspar von Saldern und die nordeuropäische Politik im Zeitalter Katharinas II., etc. 
(Erlangen; Kiel: Palm & Enke; Walter G. Mühlau, 1932), 3ff. The most detailed history is still Edvard Holm, Danmark-
Norges Historie fra den store nordiske Krigs Slutning til Rigernes Adskillelse, 1720-1814, 7 vols. (Kjøbenhavn: Gad, 
1891-1912). I will be drawing on both these works in my discussion of the Great Northern War below.
13 In the following, I am relying on the accounts in Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie; Brandt, Caspar von 
Saldern; Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben.
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engage in further hostilities against Sweden and to respect the sovereignty of Holstein-Gottorp over 
its lands. 
Frederick IV re-entered the war in 1709, however. When Stenbock, the Swedish field 
marshal, led a Swedish army into northern Germany in 1712, the war took a decisive turn. Hard 
pressed by united Danish, Saxon and Russian forces, Stenbock retreated northwards into Schleswig-
Holstein. At this point, the ministers and ‘administrator’ (guardian) of the young Charles Frederick 
decided to offer Stenbock protection in the main Holstein-Gottorp fortification at Tønning at the 
mouth of the river Eider, in southern Schleswig. This was done in secret, as it was arguably contrary
to Holstein-Gottorp neutrality in the war, declarations of which were simultaneously given to King 
Frederick IV. Danish forces besieged Stenbock’s forces at Tønning, forcing them to surrender in 
1713. This led to the discovery of documents allegedly proving the duplicity of the Holstein-
Gottorp ministers, and subsequently to Danish occupation and sequestration of the Gottorp lands in 
Schleswig and Holstein. 
At the end of the Great Northern War, the peace treaty of Frederiksborg (1720) confirmed 
Danish dominion over Schleswig, while the German Emperor Charles VI, to whom duke Charles 
Frederick had appealed as his supreme liege lord, secured the restitution of the Gottorp possessions 
in Holstein.14 This would not be the end of the matter, however, for Charles Frederick would 
continue campaigning, now from Russia, for the restitution of his lands in Schleswig as well, a 
question in which most of the major European powers would regularly become involved.15
While Denmark concluded a treaty with both Russia and Vienna in 1732 according to which 
Denmark would pay Charles Frederick 2 million Rigsdaler (Rdl.) in return for Gottorp renouncing 
its claims to Schleswig, neither Russia nor the German Emperor had been able to persuade Charles 
14 The circumstances and drafting of the peace treaty of Frederiksborg, as part of his detailed account of 
the Danish-Norwegian participation in the Great Northern War, can be found in Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten 
glorwürdigstes Leben, II: 19.
15 Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, I: 48.
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Frederick to give his consent to this.16 As such, the question of the legitimacy of the Danish 
sequestration of the Gottorp lands became a bargaining chip in the negotiations during the Polish 
War of Succession (1733–1735/1738), and the Danish crown sought assurances for its possessions 
from all of the powers involved, each giving or questioning such assurances in turn, according to 
their own interests and expediencies.
4. Amthor’s legitimization of the Danish conquest
There clearly was a great deal of power politics involved in the question of the recognition of the 
Danish sequestration of Schleswig, but since any recognition had to take the form of treaties, there 
was equally a question of legal and moral legitimization.17 The first wave of polemics came 
immediately after the Danish conquest of Tønning and occupation of Schleswig in 1714–1715, 
while Hojer's intervention came in August 1735, two months before the peace preliminaries of the 
Polish War of Succession in October 1735 and three years before the final settlement in 1738.
During the pamphlet war following the fall of Tønning and the Danish sequestration of 
Gottorp lands, the Danish case was chiefly made (anonymously) by Christoph Heinrich Amthor, the
former professor of natural law at Kiel University. In the In iure et facto Gegründeter Beweis der 
vielfältigen Treulosigkeiten (1715), Amthor answered two Holstein-Gottorp pamphlets: the 
Succincte Deduction and the In facto gegründete umbständliche Nachricht from 1714.18
16 Ibid., II: 53.
17 For another study of the interplay between power politics and moral-legal legitimization, see Pärtel 
Piirimäe, ‘The Capitulations of 1710 in the Context of Peter the Great’s Foreign Propaganda,’ in Die baltischen 
Kapitulationen von 1710: Kontext - Wirkungen - Interpretationen, eds. Karsten Brüggemann, Mati Laur, and Pärtel 
Piirimäe (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2014), 65–86.
18 [Christoph Heinrich Amthor], In iure et facto Gegründeter Beweis der vielfältigen Treulosigkeiten, So 
das Jetzt-regierende Allerdurchlauchtigste Königl. Dähnische Haus von dem Fürstl. Holstein-Gottorfischen bisher 
erlitten / Worin ... ausführlich gezeiget wird, Daß das Hertzogthum Schleswig durch offenbahre Rebellionen ... von der 
Krohne Dennemarck zum erstenmahl abgerissen, hernach durch gleich wenig zugelassene Felonien ... zur Souveraineté
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Central to the Danish case was the argument that Gottorp had broken its treaties and reneged 
on its promise of neutrality by giving Tønning over to Stenbock and the Swedish army. In so doing,
Gottorp revealed itself to be an enemy of Denmark-Norway, a fact further corroborated by the 
secret treaty and articles that had been concluded between the House of Gottorp and field marshal 
Stenbock as representative of the Swedish king, and that had duly been published when they fell 
into Danish hands.19 This in turn justified the occupation and eventual sequestration of Gottorp 
lands by Frederick IV. As Amthor argued, when Gottorp assisted the Swedish army and let it into 
Tønning, ‘His Royal Majesty of Denmark was given most necessary cause, according to all laws of 
nature and of nations, to enter the Ducal lands, and defend himself as far as possible against this 
new approaching enemy together with the old’.20 As such, Frederick IV was further justified in 
sequestrating the Gottorp lands not just in Schleswig but also in Holstein, to prevent further Gottorp
aggression and ensure the security of his realm.21
erhaben ... (Kopenhagen, 1715); [Anonymous], Succincte Deduction daß Seine König Majest von Dennemark des 
Hoch-Fürst. Hauses Holstein-Gottorp Aggressor seyn, 1714; [Anonymous], In Facto Gegründete umbständliche 
Nachricht, Wie Der Königl. Dänische Hoff Des Fürstl. Holstein-Gottorpischen Hauses Untergang und Ruin beständig 
gesuchet, auch aus einer solchen absicht weder Verträge, noch Friedensschlüsse jemahln gehalten ...  / Auff 
Gnädigsten Befehl publiciret Im Jahr 1714, 1714.
19 [Anonymous], Wahrhafter Abdruck Des In Händen habenden Original-Tractats nebst den Separat-Articuln / 
So Zwischen dem Fürstl. Hauße Gottorff und Dem Königl. Schwedischen Raht und Feld-Marschall Graffen von 
Steenbock unterm 21ten Januarii Anno 1713. im Rahmen Sr. Königl. Mayst. von Schweden getroffen und geschlossen 
worden, umb Dadurch, ... das Gegen Ihre Königl. Majest. zu Dennemarck,  Norwegen [et]c. und Dero Alliirte von Dem
Fürstlichen Hauße Gottorff begangenes treuloses und wieder alle Conventiones und Verträge, unverantwortliches und 
Friedbrüchiges Verfahren der gantzen unpartheischen Welt an den Tag zu legen (Kopenhagen: Königl. Maj. und Univ. 
privilegirten Buchdr., 1714).
20 ‘Hiedurch bekahmen nun Ihro Königl. Majest. von Dännemarck nach allen Natürlichen / und Völcker-
Rechten / höchstgemüssigten Anlasz / die Fürstlichen Länder einzuziehen / und so viel möglich sich dieses neuen 
zudringlichen Feindes mit dem Alten auf eins zuentschütten.’ [Amthor], In Iure Et Facto Gegründeter Beweis, 70.
21 Ibid., 74.
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Faced with the occupation and sequestration of their lands following the defeat of the Swedes
and the fall of Tønning, and the uncovering of documents supposedly proving their duplicity, the 
Gottorp ministers and pamphleteers adopted several arguments. First and foremost, they argued – 
mainly on the basis of the legal, political and military history of Denmark-Norway and Holstein-
Gottorp – that Gottorp had not violated its obligations of neutrality in admitting Stenbock's Swedish
army into Tønning. It was in fact Denmark that was the true aggressor, declaring war against 
Sweden in contradiction of existing treaties with Gottorp. The authority of Hugo Grotius was cited 
to argue that Gottorp was thereby absolved of obligations towards Denmark.22 At the same time, it 
was also denied that Stenbock had been invited into Tønning and asserted that it had happened 
without the knowledge and consent of duke Charles Frederick. These assertions were marshalled to 
argue that the sequestration was illegal and that although Frederick IV might think himself injured 
by the guardian of Charles Frederick, he, the Danish king, should nevertheless restore the lands to 
the young duke, ‘an entirely innocent young lord’. To achieve this purpose, the Gottorp ministers 
appealed to the Imperial Diets and the care of the Emperor as the ‘supreme guardian’ (Ober-
Vormündische Fürsorge) of Charles Frederick.23 Another pamphlet referred to a treaty concluded 
between Gottorp and Prussia as well as other declarations to show that the ‘unbiased powers’ 
(ohnpartheyische Puissancen) guaranteeing the Westphalian, Northern and other recent peace 
treaties were sympathetic to the plight of a ‘still minor prince facing utter ruin’ and regarded the 
Danish occupation as ‘unjust and insufferable’.24
22 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.15.§15, cited in In Facto Gegründete umbständliche Nachricht, para. 
215.
23 Succincte Deduction, 11f.
24 ‘Dasz hingegen auch andere ohnpartheyische Puissances des Fürstl. Hauses gegenwertige zerrüttung 
und Seiner unschuldigen lande verheerung ebenfalls vor ungerecht und unleydlich ansehen / wie ingleichen den für 
augen liegenden eussersten ruin eines annoch minderjährigen Fürsten höchstrühmlich behertzigen / ist theils aus dem 
sub lit. D. beygehenden art. 8. des zwischen Jhr. Königl. Majest. in Preussen und des Herrn Administratoris Durchl. 
errichteten tractat, theils aus einiger hohen Puissancen, welche die Westphälische / Nordische / Fontainebleauische / 
10
In his replies, Amthor constructed a section-by-section rejection of the Gottorp case. This 
included a detailed legal interpretation of the initial division of Schleswig-Holstein between 
Denmark and Gottorp as well as subsequent treaties. He also argued in detail that Gottorp’s actions 
in Denmark’s war with Sweden were in contradiction of its obligations as a neutral party, according
to the laws of nature and nations, drawing on Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis, as well as more
recent discussions by Johann Heinrich Boeckler.25 What is particularly interesting for our purposes, 
however, is Amthor’s treatment of the Gottorp pamphleteers’ appeal to and use of the minority 
status of Charles Frederick. As we have seen, Gottorp used the minority of Charles Frederick to 
argue that he was not party to the administrator’s actions, and in particular to appeal for the 
protection of the Emperor (as supreme guardian) and other major powers within the legal 
framework of the imperial constitution and European peace treaties. This had the further effect of 
constituting Frederick IV’s status in the conflict as a fellow vassal of the Emperor rather than 
sovereign king of Denmark-Norway. In contrast, Amthor construed the issue strictly as one 
pertaining to the law of nature regulating the conduct of war between two independent states.
At first, Amthor argued that while the minority of the Gottorp duke had been used to create 
sympathy for his case, the Gottorp pamphleteers had avoided the actual status controversiae in an 
attempt to conceal the injustice (Unfug) of their claim. The real issue or ‘status’, according to 
Amthor, was ‘whether an underage prince or ruler duly has to answer for what has happened during 
his minority, if he thereby suffers considerable damage’.26 In other words, the issue was whether the
young Charles Frederick should be obliged to accept the sequestration of his lands by Frederick IV 
as a consequence of the Gottorp violation of neutrality during his minority. Those who might be 
Altonaische und Travendahlische Friedensschlüsse zu garantiren übernommen haben / desfalls gegebenen 
Declarationen zu ersehen.’ In Facto Gegründete umbständliche Nachricht, para. 220.
25 The reference is to Boeckler’s Quies in turbis sive societatis bellicae declinatio. [Amthor], In Iure Et 
Facto Gegründeter Beweis, para. 50.
26 ‘Ob ein minderjähriger Printz / oder Potentate / desjenigen / was währender siner Minderjährigkeit 
geschehen / wann ihm daraus ein empfindlicher Schaden erwächset / billiger Weise zu entgelten habe?’ Ibid., para. 63.
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inclined to answer in the negative should be considered, asserted Amthor, to be led by their passions
or careless ignorance of the common law of nations (allgemeines Völcker-recht).27
Amthor argued that the fundamental error of this position was to assume that since there 
were provisions in civil law (in foro civili) protecting minors against damages resulting from the 
actions of their guardians, this would apply to an underage prince as well. But this was to 
mistakenly confuse the civil state of citizens with the state of nature in which rulers exist with 
regard to one another.28 Reason itself showed, he argued, that to accept the non-responsibility of 
underage princes (exceptio minorennitatis) would be to adopt a principle that was contrary to the 
entire sociality of states (Völcker-Socialität). It would endanger the security of all states 
neighbouring a state which had a minor ruler, for the latter would be able to do whatever it wanted 
without fearing the consequences.29 In short, whatever was done by the guardian of a minor ruler 
would have to be considered done by the ruler himself. Otherwise, Amthor argued, citing Pufendorf
and Barbeyrac, ‘there would be no true and faithful trust between such a prince and his neighbours, 
and consequently, as no reasonable moral philosopher can deny, no one would have anything to do 
with him’.30 ‘These natural reasons of rational morality’, would, Amthor trusted, suffice to show 
that the ‘present minority’ of Charles Frederick of Gottorp ‘can in no way release him from having 
to give satisfaction’ for breaching the peace against Denmark.31
27 ‘Leuthe / bey denen die Passion, oder eine nachlässige Unwissenheit des allgemeinen Völcker-rechts 
prævaliret’. Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., para. 64.
30 ‘Weil sonst bey der-gleichen Fällen / so lange der Fürst die Regierung nicht selber anträte / zwischen 
ihm und seinen Nachbahren keine Treu und sicherer Glaube mehr vorhanden seyn / einfolglich / wie kein verständiger 
Moraliste wird läugnen können / niemand mit einem jungen Fürsten würde zu schaffen haben wollen (gg).’ Citing 
Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium, III, 10, §§2-3, and Barbeyrac’s commentary in his French translation. Ibid.
31 ‘Diese natürliche Gründe der vernunfftmässigen Morale sind verhoffentlich zwar zulänglich gnug 
darzuthun / dass Ihrer Durchl. Hertzog Carl Friedrichs bisherige Minorennitæt das Haus Gottorff auf keinerley Weise 
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Whether Amthor’s intervention on Danish side proved significant or not is difficult to say. 
Regardless, the debate indicates the significance of academic natural law and law of nations in 
early-eighteenth-century Denmark-Norway, as elsewhere in Europe. Academic expertise in the law 
of nature and nations was absolutely essential in maintaining Danish political interests against the 
arch-rival Sweden and its close ally to the south. The peace treaty of Frederiksborg in 1720 
confirmed the Danish sequestration of the Gottorp lands in Schleswig. But, typically of such 
treaties, this was not, as we saw, the final word in the matter, and Hojer would return to the subject 
fifteen years later, under Christian VI, Frederick IV’s son and successor.
5. Hojer’s choice of topic
This, then, was the background to Andreas Hojer's choice of the topic for his inaugural dissertation. 
Appeals to Charles Frederick’s minority had been one of several arguments drawn upon by Gottorp 
pamphleteers in trying to establish the illegitimacy and illegality of the Danish sequestration of 
Gottorp lands and in seeking to secure international support for their restitution. In this connection, 
Gottorp had primarily appealed to the imperial constitution and prior treaties; it was Christoph 
Heinrich Amthor who first established Charles Frederick’s minority as an issue specifically of the 
law of nature and nations, in order to prove – in brief – its irrelevance on those grounds. As such, 
Hojer’s dissertation simply took up in greater detail a topic established by Amthor.
Hojer knew the history of the Great Northern War very well and was most likely conscious 
that he was taking up a topic first established by Amthor, even if he did not say so explicitly. One of
Hojer’s first official appointments by the Danish monarch had been as royal historiographer, in 
1721, replacing Amthor; this was, on Amthor’s request, to continue the latter’s history of Frederick 
IV.32 Hojer finally completed a history of King Frederick IV's reign under his son, King Christian 
von der Satisfaction dispensiren könne / die es Seiner Königl. Majest. von Dännemarck wegen des letzteren 
zudringlichen Friedens-Bruchs zu leisten schuldig ist.’ Ibid., para. 65.
32 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 76, 89ff. See also documents in Rørdam, Historiske 
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VI, around 1734.33 Much of the work dealt in detail with Frederick IV’s role in the Great Northern 
War and the conflict with Gottorp. Hojer had conducted extensive archival studies for his work, and
described, among much else, Gottorp’s duplicity in simultaneously assisting Sweden and giving 
assurances of neutrality to Frederick IV, the Danish siege of the fortress Tønning and the 
subsequent conflict over the justification of the Danish occupation, including appeals to the 
minority of the Gottorp ruler.34 He was clearly familiar with Amthor’s role as anonymous 
polemicist for the Danish side and his writings in this capacity. The causes of the war, Hojer 
explained, ‘can easily be understood from the published declarations and the Amthorian writings’, 
as well as from the Swedish intrusions in recent years. In this connection it was particularly 
unfortunate that ‘it had not been common in Denmark to call upon people knowledgeable of the law
of nature and of nations, of public law, as well as of history and good policy, in controversies over 
matters of state [Staats-Deductionen]’.35 
These were precisely the topics on which Hojer had worked to establish his expertise, from 
his early work on marriages and the history of Denmark to his later defences of Denmark in the 
conflict with Hamburg. The passage was a forthright call for the necessity of expertise in natural 
law and history, and at the same time of Hojer’s own usefulness, for pursuing the political aims of 
the Danish monarchy. The inaugural dissertation thus gave Hojer the opportunity to demonstrate 
Samlinger og Studier, I: 375f and II: 375ff.
33 Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og historiker, 116; Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger og Studier, III:495. 
Although it would not be printed until 1829: Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben.
34 Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben, I: 249ff., for Hojer’s account of Gottorp’s 
appeals to the 
duke’s minority status, see p. 253. For a brief summary of the work, see Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist og 
historiker, 117–23.
35 ‘Allein zum Unglück war man in Dännemark von vielen Jahren her nicht gewohnt zu Staats-
Deductionen Leute, die der Natur- Völker- und Staatsrechte, wie auch der Ante actorum und der rechten Politik kundig, 
aufzusuchen.’ Hojer, König Friederich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben, I: 182.
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this.  That the dissertation demonstrated an expertise in natural law was emphasized explicitly in the
preface. The topic, what the right of war allowed against minors, was most appropriate for the 
discipline but had been discussed inadequately and by few. That it was also a question of the 
highest political interest (as he had emphasized in a private letter) was only hinted at – an 
‘illustrious’ issue ‘among others, that are discussed in our time’36 – but was quite obvious to anyone
with just a minimum of political awareness.
6. Hojer on the right of war against minors
The dissertation itself can be divided into four parts. Befitting an academic disputation, Hojer began
by specifying the questions that must first be answered in order to determine the rights of war 
against minors: first, what is the right of war (ius belli); and second, what does it mean to say that 
someone is a minor? On this basis, Hojer then discussed the rights of war against minor subjects 
and finally the rights of war against minor princes. Throughout the dissertation, Hojer amply 
demonstrated his expertise in the ‘modern’ natural law pioneered by Hugo Grotius and particularly 
Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, making use of the theoretical innovations and distinct 
methods of the latter two on critical and fundamental points. However, he followed neither of them 
slavishly, siding with thinkers such as G. G. Titius and C. G. Schwarz against Pufendorf, and 
betraying influences also of others of his own generation, such as M. H. Griebner, on the 
categorization of the parts of natural jurisprudence.
Hojer began by defining the right of war (ius belli) in line with the Pufendorfian conception, 
according to which it was derived from natural law, or ius universale. ‘The right of war is that part 
of universal law which defines the duties of those waging war according to the dictates of right 
reason’ concerning what is necessary for conserving human society.37 This was, as Hojer saw it, 
36 Hojer, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, fol. Ar.
37 ‘Ius belli illa pars Iuris universalis, quae officia belligerantium ex dictamine rectae rationis definit.’ 
Ibid., 2.
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now the consensus of the learned community.38 It was a position that departed from Grotius’s 
conception of the law of nations as distinct from the law of nature and a part of human voluntary 
(‘positive’) law. The latter had been the position of Samuel Rachel in Kiel and later his student 
Henrik Weghorst in Copenhagen, and it was not the only view explicitly singled out for criticism in 
Hojer’s dissertation.39 To Hojer it was an equally serious mistake to try to define this law on the 
basis of Roman law, or indeed that of other people.40 This did not mean that the inquiry into the 
laws of various states did not play a role in Hojer’s argumentation, but, as we shall see, this did and 
could not serve the purpose of determining the laws or rights of war. Hojer then explained that the 
ius which governs the ‘human race’ is of a twofold kind: perfect and imperfect, according to which 
the resulting duties were either commanded or merely permitted. Thus the ‘right of war’ consisted 
of the precepts of universal jurisprudence determining the perfect and imperfect duties of those 
waging war, that is, what was prescribed or forbidden and what was allowed or licit.41
Hojer went on to discuss the definition of minority. He presented a wide-ranging survey of 
the status of minors in various European laws, quoting passages from Greek and Roman law, 
ancient Germanic law, including Frankish and Anglo-Saxon law, old Danish and Jutish law, as well 
as the laws of various northern German cities.42 All European laws, Hojer observed, agreed in 
viewing minority as an age between childhood and adulthood (legitima aetas), where a person was 
in need of a guardian because of a certain defect of reason and inconstancy of will. As such, the 
minor person could not legally decide his own affairs independently of a guardian. What these laws 
38 Compare Hojer’s comments on ius gentium in Hojer, Ideae Icti Danici partem 1., 27f.
39 For Rachel, see Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and Politics of the Law of Nations: Political Bias in 
International Law Discourse of Seven German Court Councilors in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Leiden ; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), chap. 3. For Weghorst, see his Compendii juris naturæ, Dissertatio prima 
(Hafniae: Joachim Smetgen, 1696), 22f.




did not agree on, however, was exactly what age constituted this minority status.43 This showed, 
argued Hojer, that it was impossible to determine minority on the basis of reason alone, that is, by 
natural law. It was a matter decided solely by the authority of the legislator, that is, positive law.44 
In other words, for Hojer the historical investigation of (the incongruence of) positive laws 
served to show that there was no ‘innate norm’ stipulating minority status, but that it was a status 
instituted by human law or convention. The most that could be said of the ‘intentions’ of the 
lawgivers, argued Hojer, was that they aimed to ensure that no harm was done to the state as a result
either of the impunity of minors or of their defencelessness without guardians. While natural law 
prescribed this end, namely the security of the state and of minors, it left open the means to secure 
this end. However, in this as in so many other matters, the lawyers had started to confuse positive 
and natural law. They had thus, erroneously, concluded that the Roman and canon law stipulations 
were part of natural law, so that minors should receive restitution according to natural law 
irrespective of how they had been injured.45
This all necessitated a more careful examination of the question ‘Are there minors according 
to the discipline of natural law?’ This Hojer could confidently deny by summarizing his argument 
from the preceding pages, and confirming it with references to Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius, 
as well as Ulrik Huber and M. H. Griebner.46 Hojer further strengthened his argument by 
distinguishing between different parts of natural or universal law. In the part dealing with the 
internal constitution of states, the ius civitatis universale, there could be said to be a place for 
minority. But this was precisely in the civil state and determined by positive law, as Hojer had 
previously explained.47 His topic was, however, a different part of the ius universale, that dealing 
43 Ibid., 5.
44 ‘Utpote subnixae, hac quidem in materia, solo legislatorum arbitrio, nequaquam autem stabili & immota





with relations between states and as such the state of nature. 
In the remainder of his argument, Hojer drew on the conceptual apparatus pioneered by 
Pufendorf, with its distinction between physical and moral entities and its discussion of different 
moral personae and moral states, to develop a consistent and rather radical position on the rights of 
war against minors. Simply put, Hojer argued that neither the physical constitution nor the civic 
status as child, minor or adult within a state was relevant when it came to inter-state relations and 
the rights of war. Rather, what was relevant was, in the case of rulers, the moral persona they 
carried as office-bearers (sovereigns) in their states, and, in the case of private persons, their moral 
persona as subjects of an enemy state and even their status as full enemies if engaged in hostile acts.
Hojer began by clarifying the characteristics of the natural state as opposed to the civil state. 
Following again the Pufendorfian position, he defined the natural state as one obtaining between 
free and equal persons. As such, the rights and duties of persons in a state of nature concerned only 
the conservation and preservation of themselves and their goods. From this it followed that there 
could be no minority status in the natural state, for minority entailed a relationship of dependence, 
and this would mean entering into a ‘relationship either familial or civil, which would take the place
of the earlier state of liberty’. In their mutual relations, rulers and states were precisely ‘moral 
persons’ in the natural state, enjoying the liberty, rights and duties constituting this state. The 
conclusion was, therefore, that such a moral person could not be considered a minor. ‘Again, 
concerning complete societies and their rulers it is beyond any doubt that, although a king or a 
prince himself is a minor, considered together with his state and as its head, he cannot be considered
by other free states as a minor.’48
Having recounted a number of historical examples confirming his argument, Hojer went on 
to argue that the natural state’s ‘ignorance of minority’ was even greater in case of war, so that the 
48 ‘De integris Societatibus earumque Rectoribus adhuc magis est indubium, quantumuis Rex aut Princeps
ipse sit Minor, eum tamen vt caput suæ reipublicæ vna cum illa fpectatum non posse ab aliis liberis statibus pro Minori 
haberi.’ Ibid., 16.
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rights of war could show no respect for whatever minority status a person might have in their own 
state. Rather, ‘disregarding any difference of age or authority, whoever is an enemy may be pursued
by right of war’.49 The rights of war were determined by the justice and intention of the party 
waging war. Whoever was waging a just war could rightfully do whatever was necessary to obtain 
the end of the war and the security of their own state. ‘In short, whatever our safety or public 
security demands, or whatever can hasten peace or make it more constant and stable, all that not 
only may but even should be done by right of war to the enemy, even if a minor.’50 
The only exception Hojer was willing to make was that of infants, ‘who in no way can inflict 
harm’. Other than that, the only relevant distinction was according to the ‘status’ of the enemy, that 
is, whether he was a subject or a ruler.51 Accordingly, Hojer went on to discuss the rights of war 
against those two different classes of enemies. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to follow 
Hojer’s argumentation in all details in this regard. Suffice it to say that he allowed fairly widespread
licence to rob, abduct or kill even unarmed enemy subjects insofar as they could assist the enemy’s 
war effort, or if it was a ‘war of extinction’, which Hojer held to be a legitimate form of war.52 Thus
Hojer argued with Caspar Ziegler against Grotius that a ‘right of retaliation’ was justified not only 
against the person who had transgressed, but against his whole people or state as members of a 
‘moral person’.53 Armed minors were simply to be considered enemies: ‘here we should consider 
arms and the intention to harm us, not age’.54 In short, ‘a person is an enemy when he can rightly be 
49 ‘Adeoque ante omnia notandum est, Ius belli nullum nec habere nec admittere respectum Minorum, sed 
absque ullo vel aetatis vel auctoritatis discrimine, quotquot inter hostes sunt, iure belli persequi.’ Ibid., 17.
50 ‘quicquid vel salus nostra vel publica securitas postulat, aut ad pacem vel accelerandam vel eo 
constantius stabiliendam facere potest, id omne ex belli iure in hostem vtut Minorem recte & absque iniuria fieri non 




54 ‘Arma hic & nobis nocendi animus spectandus est, non anni.’ Ibid., 22.
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considered to be in the position of an enemy, regardless of age (…). He who assists the army of the 
enemy with arms, military works or advice, or who causes us injury, cannot be considered a 
minor.’55 
Turning to the case of a minor prince, Hojer reiterated the fundamentals of the universal right
of war. He argued, first, that ‘the natural state of equal liberty, the rights of which princes exercise 
among themselves, does not know minority or its benefits’; second, that, in war, whoever intends 
and is able to harm another should not be considered a minor but ‘a perfect enemy’; and finally, that
as far as actions are concerned which affect other rulers, ‘a ruler, as the head of his state and 
considered one moral body together with it, should always be considered of age (maior), as acting 
by his own right and wholly master of his own affairs, even if everything – in domestic and foreign 
affairs – is carried out in his name by guardians or administrators’.56
This position, Hojer argued, could not be denied without destroying all the principles of 
natural jurisprudence, as well as ‘its end and foundation, the peace of the human race’.57 Hojer 
emphasized that this was evident particularly from the characteristics of the natural state, but he also
proceeded to prove his case, as had Amthor, from the necessity of ensuring order and safety in 
international affairs. If a prince or his successors could not be held responsible for what had 
happened during his minority, he would be able to act with impunity and no neighbours could be 
safe.58 This would endanger the security not only of neighbouring states but also of the minor prince
himself and his state, as the neighbours would seek to remove him from the throne in the interest of 
55 ‘Hostis qui est, hostis loco recte habetur, in quacunque sit aetate (…) Minor denique non habetur, qui 
hostium exercitium vel armis, vel militari opera vel conciliis firmat, aut nobis damna infert.’ Ibid., 23.
56 ‘Principem ut caput suae reipublicae & unum cum illa corpus morale spectatum, in actibus, qui alios 
status aut Principes attingunt, semper haberi pro Maiore; qui sui iuris, suarumque rerum plenus sit arbiter, etiamsi 





Continuing to discuss the more specific rights of war against a minor prince, Hojer once 
again emphasized that such rights and obligations pertained not just to the prince but to the whole 
moral person of the state.60 No doubt with a view to the contemporary situation, Hojer argued that 
one could justifiably take into possession, exact tribute from and otherwise ravage the ‘dominions 
and lands’ of a prince who waged war against oneself, insofar as this was demanded by the reasons 
of war.61 Such rights of war also resulted, Hojer argued, from a prince aiding one’s enemy even if 
this fell short of actual outright aggression. This was of course precisely what Charles Frederick had
done by giving Stenbock’s army shelter in Tønning. In this case, Hojer cited Grotius’s quotation 
from Agathias that ‘he is an Enemy who does what pleases an Enemy’.62 Against the objection that 
it would be more virtuous to conserve a minor prince, and restore his lands after hostilities had 
ended than to ruin him completely, Hojer answered that these were considerations of virtue and 
political prudence, not of justice or natural law. Natural law demanded that a state look to its own 
security also in the future, and in fact both virtue and prudence dictated that one should deprive an 
enemy of weapons and lands by which he could do one harm.63
Hojer concluded his inaugural dissertation by turning to the question of whether the rights of 
the victor resulted solely from the consent of the vanquished. This was again implicitly addressing 
the contemporary situation, for, as we saw, Charles Frederick had refused to consent to both the 
peace treaty of Frederiksborg and the settlement brokered by Russia and Vienna and thereby Danish




62 Ibid., 39. I am here citing from the English translation in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 
ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), book III, chap.17, §3. 
63 Hojer, De eo quod iure belli licet in minores, 41–43.
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rights of victory and retains what he has justly occupied, even if the minor objects’.64 Hojer 
explicitly disagreed here with Pufendorf and Hobbes, according to whom the rights of the victor 
resulted only from ‘a pact with the defeated’ who submitted to the will of the victors. Instead, he 
argued with J. F. Horn, G. G. Titius and C. G. Schwarz that by ‘the victory itself’ and the law of 
nature ‘arise supreme rule’ over the vanquished and the occupied things, ‘apart from any preceding 
pact’.65 This is because otherwise there would be no end to war, or war would be renewed on the 
pretext that consent had not been truly given, which would be contrary to the natural right of war. In
fact, Hojer presented Pufendorf as having come to much the same conclusion, quoting a longer 
passage from De officio hominis et civis, where it was argued that a party engaging in war was held 
to have ‘tacitly consented’ in whatever condition the war resulted in.66 All that therefore remained 
according to the law of nature was that the victor ensured his security and satisfaction, retaining as 
far as necessary the goods, lands and dominions of the enemy, defending and fortifying them to 
prevent further hostilities. That is: the Danish king should retain his possessions in Schleswig to 
pre-empt further danger arising from Charles Frederick allying with Sweden.
7. Conclusion: a radical Pufendorfian in the service of Denmark-Norway
On the basis of the preceding discussion and by way of concluding, we are now in a better position 
to address two questions. First, why was a professorship in natural law and the law of nations 
created at Copenhagen University and why was Hojer appointed? Second, why did Hojer choose for
his inaugural dissertation the topic he did, and what does that tell us about his natural law profile?
Although the professorship in natural law and the law of nations was created with the new 
university statutes of 1732 and filled with the appointment of Hojer in 1734, there had been ongoing
concerns with improving the teaching of that discipline for decades. There was thus a clear sense of 
64 ‘fruitur tamen victor iure victoriae, & retinet, quae iuste occupavit, etiam reclamante Minore’, Ibid., 44.
65 Ibid. Reading ‘naturae’ for ‘natura’. 
66 Ibid., 45.
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the need to offer this new and popular subject to students in Denmark. What Hojer’s career and 
remarks emphasize is that an expertise in the subject was a political necessity. The Danish 
monarchs Christian V (grandfather of Christian VI) and Frederick IV needed to draw on experts in 
the field to justify their political interests domestically and abroad, particularly against Sweden and 
the dukes of Gottorp, but also vis-à-vis Hamburg and the German Empire more broadly.
Both of these needs could only have been accentuated by the Gottorp university in Kiel. 
Although the university of a very minor power, it was both geographically and, in many ways, 
intellectually closer than Copenhagen to the new developments in Germany. It had been one of the 
first universities to create a chair in natural law, which had been held by Samuel Rachel, who had 
used this expertise to defend Gottorp interests against the Danish kings in the later seventeenth 
century. Denmark-Norway simply lacked a comparable academic tradition and expertise, and 
accordingly had to draw on foreigners to supply this: that both Weghorst and Amthor were called 
from Kiel should not be explained only by its geographical proximity.
It would seem that both these concerns were present in creating the new chair in natural law. 
That Hojer was appointed to the position has been credited to his activities and writings on behalf of
Danish interests in a conflict with the city of Hamburg over its refusal to accept Danish currency.67 
Hojer’s eagerness to demonstrate the political utility of his expertise in natural law is evident from 
the topics he suggested for the dissertation. The topic of the rights of war against minors allowed 
Hojer to address both concerns. First, it held immediate relevance as the Danish dominion over 
Schleswig became a matter of discussion in the Polish War of Succession. Second, it was also the 
subject most suited to demonstrate his expertise in the field. It was the only topic that he himself 
characterized as pertaining to ‘the law of nature and nations’, the others being topics of ‘ius 
publicum’.68
67 Rørdam, Historiske Samlinger og Studier, IV: 135f., see also III: 516; Jørgensen, Andreas Hojer, jurist 
og historiker, 143.
68 ‘Disp. Juris Nat. & G.’ Hojer, ‘[Letter to an unnamed “Monseigneur”]’, [2].
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As we have seen, Hojer drew fully on the Pufendorfian conceptual framework of moral 
personae, and what has been termed Pufendorf’s conventionalist conception of natural law and 
morality. This indicates his personal interest in taking up the topic, as well as the distinctive 
characteristics of his natural law profile within the larger context of natural law theorizing and 
enlightenment thought in early-eighteenth-century Denmark-Norway. Hojer seems to have been 
particularly interested in the conventionalist theory of morality and politics suggested by 
Pufendorf’s theory of natural law, as well as its potential to fundamentally undermine contemporary
‘naturalist’ conceptions of morality.69 During his studies in Halle, Hojer seems to have adopted 
Thomasius’s interest in criticizing this naturalistic theory of morality, which Thomasius had 
characterized as the scholastic doctrine of perseitas, as well as an interest in pushing the 
Pufendorfian conceptual framework to its limits. In his dissertation on the rights of war against 
minors, and particularly in his work on the non-prohibition of incestuous marriages, Hojer was 
developing this agenda, reaching conclusions that, while perhaps serviceable to Denmark’s absolute
monarchs, went far beyond the moral commonplaces of his day, and even ours.70 That he could do 
so and still hold such influential positions in early-eighteenth-century Denmark is arguably what 
makes Hojer such an interesting figure and the question of his significance for the early 
enlightenment in Denmark so pressing.
69 For a characterization of Pufendorf's natural law theory in this regard in the context of discussing 
Holberg, see Haakonssen, ‘Holberg’s Law of Nature and Nations’. 
70 An influential proponent of the scholastic doctrine of ‘perseitas’ in Denmark around 1700 was Henrik 
Weghorst, for which see Jensen, ‘Contests about Natural Law in Early Enlightenment Copenhagen’. For Holberg’s 
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